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plaintiff. Hence, he felt that these leases were not void
but only unenforceable and that, since they were performed
by the parties themselves, the tenancy should not be con-
sidered as a holding from year to year. Having voluntarily
performed its contract, the lessor ought not to be placed in
a worse position than if the lease had been specifically
enforced.
IMPLICATION OF SURVIVORSHIP IN CONTINGENT
GIFTS TO A CLASS
Reese v. Reese 1
Evans v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co.2
The above recent Maryland cases present an interesting
problem of construction in connection with gifts to a class
as distinguished from gifts to individuals. An examination
of the Court's construction in each case, as concerned
with class gifts and an implied condition precedent of sur-
vivorship, raises the question why such an implied condi-
tion is held to be a hard and fast rule when there is a
contingent gift to a class and not when the gift is to an
individual.
In the Reese case, the will, executed October 19, 1889,
devised to the testator's unmarried son, John B. Reese, a
life estate in his farm (with certain conditions not here
important). The will then contained the following provi-
sion: "In case of the death of Mary L. Reese [testator's
daughter], John B. Reese, and the wife of John B. Reese,
then the whole of said property to go to the children of
John B. Reese and wife, if any, and if no children, then
the said property to revert to my grandchildren, the issue
of both of my sons, Charles A. Reese and Francis D. Reese,
as tenants in common, the issue of said sons to take same
per capita."
Under the provision, creating an alternative contingent
remainder in the grandchildren of the testator, there were
two possible constructions before the Court. First, it could
be construed as a gift to a class, i.e., a contingent gift to a
class consisting of the grandchildren of the testator, de-
pendent upon John dying without children surviving. As
the Court pointed out in its opinion "the cardinal rule for
testamentary construction is that the intention of the testa-
1 58A. (2d) 643 (Md. 1948).
'58A. (2d) 649 (Md. 1948).
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tor must be gathered from the language of the entire
instrument, read in the light of the surrounding circum-
stances at the time when the will was made." The testator
used the term "grandchildren", which could very well be
a class designation. It could be said that he intended all
of his grandchildren, the issue of both of his sons Charles
and Francis, to share in the gift. The difficulty arises
because the Court is dealing with intention and must
gather that intention from the words used and surrounding
circumstances. Even under the accepted Maryland defini-
tion of class gifts the Court could very well have construed
the remainder as a gift to a class. Maryland has consistently
applied Jarman's definition of a class gift as a "gift of an
aggregate sum to a body of persons uncertain in number
at the time of the gift, to be ascertained at a future time,
and who are all to take in equal or other definite propor-
tions, the share of each being dependent for its amount
upon the ultimate number of persons"2
However, the Court was influenced by certain other
factors. If the gift has been construed as a gift to a class,
then the Court would have been faced with the rule laid
down in Demil v. Reid4 that "in a case . . .where there
is an ultimate limitation upon a contingency, to a class
of persons plainly described, and there are persons answer-
ing that description in esse when the contingency happens,
they alone can take".4 a Under this rule, the Court implies
as a condition precedent that the remaindermen must sur-
vive until the happening of the contingency. Therefore,
Donald B. Reese, son of Francis D. Reese, being born after
the death of the Testator, could enter the class and par-
ticipate in the gift, whereas Rev. Clarence Reese son of
Charles A. Reese, having died before John, could not be
a member of the class.
The second possible construction, which is the one the
Court took, is that it was a gift to individuals, contingent
upon John's dying without children. Under such a con-
struction, several Maryland cases have stated that "it is
settled that all contingent estates of inheritance, as well
as springing and executory uses, and possibilities coupled
with an interest, where the person to take is certain, are
transmissible by descent, and are devisable and assign-
8JARMAN, WILLS (6th Ed.) 232; Dulaney v. Middleton, 72 Md. 67, 19 A.
146 (1890); Stahl v. Emery, 147 Md. 123, 126, 127 A. 760 (1925); Reese
v. Reese, supra, n. 1; MiLLER, CONSTRUcmoN OF WnjLS (1927) Sec. 67.
'71 Md. 175, 17 A. 1014 (1889).
11 Ibi, 191.
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able".5 There would be no condition precedent of survival
to the time of John's death without issue. Donald B. Reese,
having been born after the testator's death would be ex-
cluded. Appellant, however, as widow of Rev. Clarence
Reese would participate because on his death his contingent
interest passed to the Appellant as his sole legatee.
The Court in construing the gift as a contingent gift to
individuals rather than as a gift to a class, was influenced
by the possible effect of the Rule against Perpetuities and
the use of the word "revert". The Court stated that "if
it were held in this case that the estate does not vest until
the time for possession and enjoyment, the limitation
would be within the Rule against Perpetuities, for it might
have been possible that John B. Reese would marry a
woman not yet born at the time of the testator's death and
she might live longer than 21 years after John's death".
However, this is not true, for under the limitation, the
property would vest in interest in the grandchildren on
the death of John without issue, subject only to the post-
ponement of enjoyment during the life estate in his wife
if she survived him, or during the life estate of Mary, if
she survived him. The Rule does not require the vesting
in possession or enjoyment within the maximum period,
but only the vesting in interest.a Here the interest must
vest, if at all, on the death of John, the measuring life. By
the terms of the will, on his death without children, the
final remainder was to "revert to" the grandchildren at
that point. In case John should die leaving a widow, "then
the widow shall have what remains from the income after
sufficient is taken out for the support of Mary." In any
event, on the death of John, the remainder became vested
in interest, although the vesting in possession or enjoyment
might have been postponed for a longer time to let in the
life estate of either Mary or John's widow, in the event
either survived John. However, under either alternative
construction, the remainder would vest in interest immedi-
ately on John's death and thus could not violate the Rule
against Perpetuities.
54 KENT, COMMENTARIES, 261; Snively v. Beavans, 1 Md. 208 (1851);
Hambleton v. Darrington, 36 Md. 434 (1872) ; Buck v. Lantz, 49 Md. 439
(1878) ; Fisher v. Wagner, 109 Md. 243, 249, 71 A. 999 (1909); Safe
Deposit and Trust Company v. Bouse, 181 Md. 351, 357, 29 A. (2d) 906
(1942) ; Hammond v. Piper, 185 Md. 314, 318, 44 A. (2d) 756 (1945).
5 GRAY, RuLu AGAINST PERPTrUITUS (4th Ed.) Sec. 118; Curtis v.
Baptist Union Ass'n, 176 Md. 430, 438, 5 A. (2d) 836 (1939) ; Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 107, 179 A. 536 (1935).
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The Court was equally influenced by the words "to
revert" to the grandchildren, which the Court held sug-
gested the idea that the estate was to return to designated
persons who might inherit if the testator had no grand-
children through John, i.e., that "revert" means to return
to designated persons and not to go to a future class. It
might be added also that the Restatement of Property re-
quires for a class gift that the creator of the gift be "group-
minded".' Here the testator did not bequeath the gift to
all of his grandchildren, but singled out the issue of his
sons Charles and Francis, without mentioning his daughter
Mary. Perhaps it could be argued that the testator lacked
the requisite "group-mindedness", and that in truth it was
a gift to individuals.
In the Evans case the father by deed granted unto
Henrietta, her heirs and assigns, a described piece of ground
in Baltimore, in trust for Julia Rogers for life, then to her
children, but if she should die "without issue living" then
to the children of Samuel Scribner, the settlor, the chil-
dren of a deceased child to take their parent's share. Later
the settlor executed his will disposing of all of his property
remaining after the execution of the deed. At the time
the deed was executed, the settlor had two living children,
Henrietta and Mary, in addition to Julia Rogers, who was
a child of a deceased daughter. Henrietta died unmarried
in 1906, leaving her estate to Julia Rogers. Mary died in
1899 leaving four children, all of whom died before the
life tenant, Julia Rogers, who died in 1944 without issue.
Appellees are the persons who would be entitled to any
interest passing under the testator's will or any interest
in the two children Henrietta and Mary which would be
transmissible on their deaths. Appellants are the heirs
of the settlor as of 1944, when Julia Rogers died.
Again the Court had before it two possible construc-
tions. It could construe the deed as creating an alternative
contingent remainder to a class consisting of the settlor's
children or their descendants, if Julia died without issue.
Under such a construction, the Demil v. Reid rule would
again be in focus and since neither Henrietta nor Mary nor
their descendants survived until the death of Julia with-
out issue, the alternative contingent remainder to the set-
tlor's children would fail. Appellants argued for this con-
struction and they contended that this left the settlor a
possibility of reverter rather than a reversion and such
an interest was not devisable and vested in the settlor's
SRESTkTEM=T, ROPE&RTY (1940) Sec. 279.
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heirs as of 1944, when Julia died. The Court could pos-
sibly construe the gift as one to individuals, for at the
time of the execution of the deed, the settlor had only two
living children, Henrietta and Mary. Under such a con-
struction, both Henrietta and Mary would take a trans-
missible interest in a contingent remainder, as held in the
Reese case, so that the Appellees would be entitled to their
shares as the heirs and devises of Henrietta and Mary.
The Court refused to construe it as a gift to individuals
but held "It is sufficient to assume, without deciding,
that the deed did make a class gift to 'children', conditioned
upon survival".6a Thus acting under the impact of the rule
laid down in Demil v. Reid the Court assumed that survival
up until Julia's death without children in 1944 was a condi-
tion precedent. Since Henrietta and Mary both predeceased
Julia, the Appellees claiming under them would be ex-
cluded. However, the Court held that the settlor retained
a reversion and not a possibility of reverter and that
such interest passed by the settlor's will to the Appellees.
Thus the Appellees acquired the property under another
legal construction other than the one under consideration.
In comparing these two cases, it is noted that the Court
had before it in both the problem of construction as to
whether there was a contingent gift to a class or to indi-
viduals, and the resultirng ramifications of the Demil v.
Reid rule. The facts of the two cases, the use of group
descriptions, put the cases somewhat on equal parity. In
the Reese case the Court held that it was a gift to indi-
viduals and thus there was no implication of survivorship
as a condition precedent. In the Evans case, the Court held
that it was a gift to a class and thus contingent upon sur-
vivorship. Such a comparison immediately raises the ques-
tion, why the implication of survivorship is the one case,
when it is a gift to a class, and not when it is a gift to
individuals?
One writer contends that there should be no fixed rule
of law that a contingent class gift cannot be so created
that, if a member of a class dies before the contingency
happens, his interest will pass to his executors, adminis-
trators, heirs, or devisees.7 In reading the cases it is often
difficult to determine just how the courts approach the
problem; whether the courts are influenced by the rule in
determining whether it is a class gift, or whether, for-
getting the implication of survivorship, they construe the
" Supra, n. 2, 654.
" 2 SIMzs, FUTURE INTmEST (196) See. 391.
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limitation as being to a class or to individuals, and then
apply the Demil v. Reid rule if it is a gift to a class. Clearly,
if the testator expressly provides for survival, then the
members must survive the contingency. In most cases it
is a problem of construction, in which the courts are
influenced by the general tenor of the entire instrument,
in the light of the surrounding circumstances. However,
it is urged by Simes that there should be no fixed rule of
law as seems to be the rule of Demil v. Reid. He points
out that "it is believed that such authority as there is to
the contrary is due to one of two things:
"1. It may be a result of a failure to distinguish
between contingent, meaning subject to the particular
condition precedent that the donee survive the period
of distribution. The courts tend to reason thus; this
interest is clearly contingent, being subject to a con-
dition precedent. It being contingent, the donee must
survive the period of distribution .... 2. May in part
be due to a tendency to assume that a class gift is con-
tingent, so long as the class may still increase",8
Under the rule of Demil v. Reid, two contingencies are
applied where the creator only imposed one. For example,
in the Evans case the testator imposed the contingency
that Julia die without issue living, if so, then the class
takes. The Court superimposes the second contingency that
the members of the class survive and that only those per-
sons answering the description in esse when the contin-
gency happens can take. Why should the Court imply what
the settlor could very easily have expressed had that been
his intent? If we would strike down the first contingency,
then the remainder would be a vested one and the rule
that the law favors the early vesting of estates comes into
play, and the requirement of survival to the time of vesting
in possession would not be implied, so that the children
would have a transmissible interest.' This suggests that
the second contingency should not be implied. As one
writer so aptly put it, "when a testator has a real intention,
it is not once in a hundred times that he fails to make his
6 Ibid, See. 391.
9MILL, CoNsmuC'rmmo OF WILLS (1927) See. 222; Tayloe v. Mosher,
29 Md. 443 (1868) ; Lewis v. Payne, 113 Md. 127, 77 A. 321 (1910) ; Wilson
v. Pichon, 162 Md. 199, 159 A. 766 (1932) ; Plitt v. Peppler, 167 Md. 252,
173 A. 35 (1934) ; Cole v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 143 Md. 90, 95, 121
A. 911 (1923) ; Curtis v. Baptist Union Ass'n., 176 Md. 430, 5 A. (2d) 836
(1939).
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meaning clear .... When the judges say that they are
interpreting the intention of the testator, what they are
doing ninety-nine times out of a hundred is deciding what
shall be done with his property on contingencies that he
did not have in contemplation". 10 The Court itself in the
Evans case cited Miller to the effect that the result of the
rule sometimes is that children of deceased children are
excluded from their parents' share, "an unfortunate result,
based upon a very technical rule"" It is logical to assume
that the testator in making the gift to "children" or
"nephews", and the like, had in mind living persons whom
he intended should share his bounty in the event the first
taker failed to have issue. This logical assumption is
strengthened by the fact that normally the desire of the
testator is to give his property to those he knows.
On the other hand, using a group designation is an
indication of an intent to benefit as many as possible.
Applying both intentions, it becomes sound to allow those
members of the class in existence when the testator died
to take a transmissible interest rather than to refuse to
open the class until the happening of the contingency and
then immediately close it, as is the rule under Demil v.
Reid, where the gift is otherwise contingent. If we allow
those members of the class in existence at the date of the
testator's death to share and those born thereafter, we
give effect to testator's intent to benefit those he knew
and was acquainted with, and also effect to the argument
that a group designation is indicative of an intention to
benefit as many members of the class as possible. The rule
of Demil v. Reid defeats both intentions.
Furthermore, as pointed out, Maryland has adopted
Jarman's definition of a class gift. It states that it is "a gift
of an aggregate sum to a body of persons uncertain in
number at the time of the gift". Under the Demil v. Reid
rule, as applied to contingent gifts to a class, the time of
the gift is on the death of the life tenant. If so, then the
members are not uncertain at the time of the gift, the
death of the life tenant, but rather, since only those in
esse then can take, they are fixed and determined indi-
viduals. "If it [Jarman's rule] means the time when the
10 GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW, Sec. 702; see also Howard,
Remainders "Prom and After" Life Estates in Maryland (1943) 8 Md. L.
Rev. 269, where the author states that "It is the thesis of this article,
in general, that the Maryland Court of Appeals has overburdened itself
by excessive insistence on 'construction of wills', and that having com-
mitted itself to one construction, it has reemphasized it in other will cases
to the detriment of other Testator's purposes".
"1MILLE, COxSTrUCTmio OF WILLS (1927) 676, n. 4.
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gift takes effect, there can never be a class, for the persons
to take are always determined and certain in number."'1
Thus the rule seems to conflict even with Jarman's defini-
tion which Maryland purports to adopt. A contrary rule,
that is, that all of the members whether they survive to
the happening of the contingency or not, should take trans-
missible interests is better adapted to the purpose of class
descriptions. If we let in those the testator probably had
in mind, along with those who are born prior to the hap-
pening of the contingency, we have a true class gift under
Jarman's definition.
In the event that there are no members of the class in
existence on the happening of the contingency, though
there were members of the class when the testator died,.
there would be intestacy in many cases as in the Evans
case under this rule. Such a construction is repugnant to
the intention of the testator as gathered from the four
corners of the will. It is evident that the testator did not
intend intestacy, for he made a will. "It is an accepted rule
that where there are two possible constructions, either of
which can be adopted without straining the language of
the will, the court will adopt that construction which dis-
poses of the entire estate, rather than one which results
in total or partial intestacy". 13 This well settled principle
is violated in those cases where intestacy would result from
a failure of any members of the class to survive the con-
tingency.
As one writer points out, "Our Court of Appeals has
never explained the reason for the rule (Demil v. Reid).
Possibly the rule resulted from the failure of the courts
to distinguish between the terms 'contingent' and 'trans-
missible', . . . yet we have clear cut decisions in Maryland
that a contingent remainder to a designated individual
is transmissible". 4 That author is also of the opinion that
the Demil v. Reid rule is without reason, and is an "arbi-
trary construction by the courts of the testator's intent".1"
The Restatement of Property is also opposed to the rule.
It provides: "From the fact that a class can increase in
12Cooley, What Con8titutes a Gift to a Cla88 (1936) 49 Harvard L. Rev.
903, 927, n. 80, where the author criticizes Jarman's rule.
152 JARMAN, WILLS (5th Am. Ed. 1880) Ch. 25, Sec. 1-7; Dulany v.
Middleton, 8upra, n. 3, 75-76; Welsh v. Gist, 101 Md. 606, 61 A. 665 (1905) ;
Lavender v. Rosenheim, 110 Md. 150, 72 A. 669 (1909) ; Phillips v. Taylor,
148 Md. 157, 129 A. 18 (1925) ; Gosnell v. Leibman, 162 Md. 542, 160 A.
277 (1932).
u Reno, Alienability and Tran8nia8ibility of Future Intere8ts in Maryland
(1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 89, 118.
Ibi, 11&
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membership until a certain future date, no inference should
be made that only such members of the class as survive
to such future date become distributees."'16 In the comment
to the above section it is stated that "under the rule stated
in sub-section 2, no requirement of survival to the time
of distribution is properly inferable from the fact that the
limitation creates in the members of the class, interests
which are subject to be diminished in size by the birth of
future persons fitting the group description found in the
limitation"." Further opposition to the rule is manifested
in another section which provided "In the limitation pur-
porting to create a remainder, or an executory interest,
the presence of a condition precedent, or of a defeasibility
dependent on other facts is not a material factor in deter-
mining the existence of the requirement of survival to the
time of the fulfillment or elimination of such other condi-
tion precedent or defeasibility", 8 In the comment to this
section it is noted that "The rule stated in this section
would be almost too obvious for statement, if it were
not for the erroneous view, often expressed in cases con-
cerning class gifts, that the members of the class necessarily
remain subject to the condition precedent of survival so
long as the ultimate ascertainment of the class is postponed
by another defeasibility or condition precedent of such
gift ... ."" The Maryland Court of Appeals itself in the
Evans case points out that the Restatement of Property
seems to regard survival as a question of construction in
each case with respect to class gifts and gifts to individuals,
not necessarily an implied condition in the case of con-
tingent gifts to a class.
The modern tendency is to regard all future interests
as alienable. There is a definite trend steering away from
"recondite doctrines of ancient property law". 0 There has
been a gradual evolution toward the free alienability of
contingent future interests from the rule of non-alienabil-
ity. The modern tendency is to hold that contingent re-




"Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940), concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Roberts. As a result of this decision, a distinction as to vested or
contingent remainders is no longer a problem in the field of federal taxa-
tion. See also, Jones, Vested and Contingent Remnianders, A Suggestion
with Respect to Legal Method (1943) 8 Md. L. Rev. 1, 20-21, wherein the
writer states that the courts should abandon their basic assumption that
all cases involving remainders must be solved by first classifying the
Interest as vested or contingent, but should solve the problem on hand.
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mainders are freely alienable irrespective of whether that
contingency be as to event or as to persons."' This ten-
dency lends weight to any criticism of the rule of Demil
v. Reid, which makes an arbitrary distinction between gifts
to individuals and gifts to a class. It is admitted that the
great weight of authority supports the rule but a growing
minority has repudiated it.22 Perhaps one remedy is a
statute to the effect that all future interests including rights
of entry and possibilities of reverter, which are not ex-
pressly made terminable by the death of the owner, shall
be alienable inter vivos and pass in case of intestate succes-
sion in the same manner as possessory interest.23
Book Review
CIVILIZATION ON TRL. By Arnold J. Toynbee. Oxford
University Press, 1948.
What kind of an estimate can be put on this, the latest
work of the famous historian?
In part it consists of theological discussions so fine spun
as to be reminiscent of the age of the Schoolmen.
Like Sorokin's "Reconstruction of Humanity", it is a
call for spiritual improvement. But the methods of these
two authors and their points of view are far apart. Toynbee
believes that we have in us today about as much of the old
Adam as did our Neanderthal ancestors (248, 255). He
concludes that the Kingdom of Heaven will not be estab-
lished on earth (241).
Individuality, he says, is a great "pearl", but this indi-
viduality is not that as usually understood but it is the
individuality of the "soul" (254, 255). His idea of progress
therefore is not the individual working for the social
development of communities. The individual in making
progress for the improvement of his own soul thereby as
a by-product improves social life on earth (247, 251).
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) See. 162, Sec. 166.
Supra, n. 14, 118.
USupra, n. 14, 119. See also RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) See. 162
where the rule is stated.
[VOL. IX
